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Abstract
Smartphones and other highly mobile yet sophisticated technologies are rapidly spreading through society and
increasingly finding their way into pockets and handbags. As reliance upon these intensifies and familiarity
grows, human nature dictates that more and more personal details and information is now to be found upon such
devices. The need to secure and protect this valuable and desirable information is becoming ever more prevalent.
Building upon previous work which proposed a novel approach to user authentication, an Authentication Aura,
this paper investigates the latent security potential contained in surrounding devices in everyday life. An
experiment has been undertaken to ascertain the technological infrastructure, devices and inert objects that
surround individuals to establish if these items might be significant. The results suggest that inert possessions
may offer a surprisingly large potential with some being in close proximity to experimental subjects for over 45%
of the entire period. With other graphical analysis illustrating the consistency of presence, this work suggests that
everyday possessions and devices can be leveraged to augment traditional approaches and even in certain
circumstances, during device activation remove the need to authenticate.
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INTRODUCTION
As modern communication technology permeates ever further throughout society, the desire to remain in
constant contact with colleagues, friends and family is increasingly met. The recent surge in sales of smart
phones and other sophisticated mobile devices has driven a correlated explosion in Wi-Fi hotspot usage (In-stat,
2009; In-stat, 2011). Technological boundaries are stretching and the devices people carry are evolving with
expanding storage capabilities and processing power, enabling the porting of greater amounts of information and
personal details. As this becomes the norm for us all, these personal items become an ever-increasing target for
theft (CPP, 2010; Home Office, 2009). In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the potentially
large volumes of sensitive and personal information contained within these desirable pieces of equipment is
imperative and even acknowledged and supported by Government (Design Council, 2010; Rohde, 2001).
Authentication of the user’s identity by any device provides the first line of defence in the battle to maintain data
integrity following theft or loss. Establishing as far as possible that the operator is whom they purport to be,
provides a device with the necessary degree of confidence to allow access and service utilisation. However,
although steps have been taken to ensure the devices are only accessed by accredited individuals, the ubiquitous
point of entry user identity code and password has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability or
unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this sensitive information correctly (Albrechtsen, 2007;
Clarke and Furnell, 2005). In the event that several devices are carried simultaneously, the repeated intrusive
accreditation process becomes laborious and inconvenient. Improving and evolving the employed authentication
mechanism will go some way to counteract this burden and potentially provide an opportunity to increase the
confidence in user identity. If a user has previously authenticated upon a device, why not use that confidence to
provide automated access to other devices within a close proximity? Alternatively, authentication judgements
made across several devices could also be used to deliver a collective confidence level – increasing the level of
identity confidence that any one device could provide. Authentication Aura proposes to enable this distributed
and collaborative environment that seeks to improve the level of authentication security and minimise user
inconvenience.
With intelligent gadgets, technical infrastructure, possessions and other factors playing such a pivotal role in the
Authentication Aura’s operation it is vital to establish the viability of such an approach. Experiments have been
carried out to assess the latent potential the presence of the electronic devices and currently dumb objects offer
by assessing the amount of time individuals spend within detectable range of these pervasive items.
The following two sections further outline the Authentication Aura concept and then proceed to detail the
experiment which has been undertaken. This is then succeeded by an analysis of the experimental findings,
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exploring the manner in which identity confidence could be influenced and how it could be utilised to calculate a
new and reactive status. A summary of the paper’s findings are then outlined in a conclusion.

BACKGROUND
With the accepted fragility of the ubiquitous point of entry user identity and password authentication, research
has been widespread in attempting to improve upon this current situation (O’ Gorman, 2003; Vu et al., 2007).
One tranche of work, the Authentication Aura, suggested a distributed approach in which trusted and known
devices that had all performed unilateral authentication, shared information between one another to bolster
confidence in their own user’s identity (Hocking et al., 2010). This section briefly outlines the concept of the
Aura, enabling the reader to gain an understanding of the motivation behind the current research.
As an individual authenticates with a personal device, the piece of equipment establishes a confidence in the
user’s identity. In most scenarios this is Boolean, the user is either whom they claim to be (they pass the
authentication process) or they are not (they fail); thus the confidence is set at either complete (100%) and access
is granted or it is none and the user is barred. The Authentication Aura suggests the use of confidence erosion
following validated access which can in turn be utilised to reduce the availability of device functionality. High
confidence will permit the use of expensive applications and access to sensitive data, whilst reduced confidence
will block the use of these functions. Then when confidence erodes to a suitably low level, re-authentication of
the user will be necessary to ensure continuing availability of use.
Voice
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Face
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iPad
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Desktop
computer

Password

Laptop
computer
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Figure 1.The potential intra-device relationship and authentication techniques (Hocking et al., 2010)
To counteract this one-way-street, information pertaining to location, time since and method of authentication
can be communicated between trusted devices; the Authentication Aura utilises each set of these conveyed
details and other detected possessions to calculate a positive confidence contribution, slowing the degradation
process. Figure 1 shows an example of how the information might be relayed amongst a group of commonly
owned devices.
For some intelligent devices it might be possible to undertake continuous authentication (such as voice
recognition during telephone calls) to provide frequently reconfirmed identity details and a valuable confidence
contribution, whilst others might simply act as tokens, their presence the only information of use. Figure 2
summarises this.
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Figure 2. Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent contribution to the authentication process
If the Authentication Aura is successfully implemented, there is even the potential to achieve device activation
without the need for authentication. For instance, if a user with a number of present and active devices proceeds
to switch on another item of equipment, there might be sufficient relayed confidence available to make the newly
activated item content to permit access immediately without additional intervention. With users currently
performing many authentications during a day, any savings that can be gleaned must intuitively be of benefit.

EXPERIMENT
Motivation and approach
The concept of an Authentication Aura relies on the intercommunication of information between intelligent
devices supplemented by the detection of inert household or personal items (Hocking et al., 2010). To initially
gauge the viability of this concept it is imperative that a data gathering exercise be undertaken to ascertain what
devices are present within a short distance of an experimental participant at various points in time. This
information can then be analysed to determine if there is a latent potential in surrounding devices that can be
leveraged to augment traditional security.
It would have been relatively straightforward to execute such a task on entirely intelligent devices however the
premise dictates that both dumb objects and those that might be intelligent in the future (such as household white
goods), are also included. An obvious solution would be to provide experimental subjects with pen and paper to
record devices and items that surround them at any given moment, over a period of days. Intuitively this is far
from practical. Forgetfulness and sheer imposition renders this an inappropriate approach; an alternative means
of surveying an individuals surrounding locale needed to be found.
With the requirement to include dumb and currently incapable devices, the selected method by which the
appropriate information could be identified and recorded uses radio frequency identity (RFID) tags and
associated sensing equipment. Each tag transmits a unique identification marker continuously across a short
distance. By positioning a number of these on or near individual devices and objects of interest, it is possible for
a small portable lightweight RFID reader to be constantly carried by a subject, allowing all detected tags to be
recorded at discrete time intervals. This is of suitable imposition to ensure experimental volunteers were
forthcoming.
Details
To facilitate the experiment equipment was purchased to enable the recording of data simultaneously for five
subjects. Although in an ideal world as many candidates as possible would undertake the experiment at any one
time, the prohibitive cost of equipment restricted the sample groups to five, an affordable number that would
yield a meaningful set of results. The PDA RFID readers were Dell Axim x51s, each equipped with
CompactFlash RFID nodes, capable of reading both passive and active RFID tags. Passive tags transmit their
identity in response to a polled request from the reader inducing their power from the received signal; active tags
however contain their own independent power supply in the form of a battery. Although active tags are much
more expensive to buy their main advantage is that they can be detected over a far greater range, 10-15m in clear
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line-of-sight, opposed to a maximum of 0.5m for the passive tags. Wi-Fi network infrastructure can provide
connections over a wide area and so with the need to emulate this, the experiment requires detection of tags
across several metres and through walls; it was therefore deemed prudent to spend the extra resource and secure
the active variety. As such, seventy-five active tags were purchased enabling each individual volunteer to be
supplied with fifteen, permitting them to identify and record a sufficient number of devices both at home and in
their workspace.
Table 1. Suggested locations for the RFID tags

Mobile phone
Home Wi-Fi Point
Wallet/purse
Bedside clock

Work PC
TV (s)
mp3 player
Fridge

Home PC/Laptop
Car interior
Work bag/briefcase
Hi-Fi

Work Wi-Fi point
Car keys
Home telephone
Coat pocket

Groups of volunteers that worked together were picked to ensure there was a degree of crossover within their
daytime activity allowing each subject’s recording equipment to detect other participant’s tags. In a functioning
Aura environment additional security could be engendered from familiar devices belonging to friends or
colleagues even though they are not specifically owned by the same user. Selecting groups in this way would
provide a dimension to the results data that could be analysed to assess this premise.
Each group of five subjects was instructed to undertake the experiment for fourteen days continuously, carrying
the PDA with them at all times whilst ensuring that it remained charged and active. Software was written and
deployed to the PDAs which recorded all detectable tag identities within range, their signal strength and time
stamp, at one minute intervals. The individual’s tags were placed upon or attached to items of interest
representing intelligent and dumb devices, personal possessions and infrastructure. A cross-reference list of tag
identities and locations was recorded, enabling the identification of relevant items during later analysis..
Initial observations
Upon removing the data files and commencing analysis some initial observations have been made. With
observations occurring each and every minute, twenty four hours a day, seven days a week the data set is
intuitively large. For each of the participants the experiment yields 1,440 sets of readings each day which
equates to 10,080 in total across a single week.

Figure 3. A typical user's weekday observations
Figure 3 illustrates the number of unique devices observed by an individual during a working week (MondayFriday). Each day is plotted as a separate set of readings with individual data points representing the average
number of detected devices within a fifteen minute period plotted against the time of day that the observation
was made.
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Figure 4. The same typical user's weekend observations
The weekday plot exhibits a maximum average of ten devices being detected in any given fifteen minute slot
whilst at the weekend this figure peaks at twelve, suggesting that more static tags were located at home rather
than at work. However, with such a high number of observations being recorded at both home and work it is
apparent that the majority of tags were placed on portable possessions that the subject carried with them
throughout the day. During the workdays there appears a high degree of variation in the number of observed
devices implying that this subject is active during their employment and even spends time out of the office. Time
away from their usual location can be perceived from the data on Tuesday and Thursday between 10a.m. and
4p.m. where the average falls to a single unit.
With the observed variations, fluctuations and even periods of consistency it is possible to immediately
conjecture that scope exists to leverage this information for use in security.

Figure 5. A single user's specific device observations
Figure 5 above illustrates a histogram that has been compiled from observations of specific devices for a user
throughout the duration of their fourteen day experimental participation. It shows the percentage of observations
that recorded each of their fifteen RFID tags, cross-referenced to identify the specific devices or items of
equipment. Clearly from this diagram, there is one personal item that was detected far more often than any other.
The subject’s wallet was observed during approximately 45% of all recordings executed during the two week
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experiment. So do inert devices or personal items provide greater security leverage than intelligent ones? For the
same user, by plotting days’ observations in isolation (Figures 6 and 7) it is possible to examine more clearly
how the user’s routine affects the devices that are detected. These diagrams illustrate the continuity of presence
for each possession or item of equipment across the day, when contact is established and when it is lost.
Additionally, other users’ devices are also shown (Other devices) indicating when they are also detected.
Intuitively, these foreign device contacts mainly appear on the weekday plot (Figure 6) because the other
members of the experimental group were all work colleagues but there is a single set of blips visible at
approximately 16:15 at the weekend, suggesting that the subject briefly visited their work premises.

Figure 6. A user’s isolated single weekday activity
It is interesting to note that in both examples nearly the entire observation window from 6a.m. to 12p.m. has at
least one device within detection range at any given moment. Indeed, closer examination appears to suggest that
the inert devices are present most consistently throughout the day, supporting the potential for security leverage.

Figure 7. The same user’s isolated single weekend day activity
The discussion above has concentrated upon and examined the data from just a single user. It would require a
study of many subjects to ascertain if this is unequivocally true or false, a volume of data that is not currently
available. However within the current sample set high percentages of experimental detection are attributed to
inert personal items when they were selected by an individual; indeed coats, work bags and hand bags all topped
the frequency chart for particular participants. Clearly it cannot be stated that they provide a greater security
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potential but equally it is important they should be utilised where possible because of their persistence and
inconspicuous presence.

CONFIDENCE
Confidence of identity
The concept of an Authentication Aura utilises confidence of the user’s identity in two ways. When a device is
activated and the initial security check (if there is one) is passed, the confidence of the device in the user’s
identity at that moment in time is high. The authentication has been passed and usually an implicit trust is made
by the device in giving the user unrestricted access to the services and data it holds. This level of trust remains
unwavering and unchallenged unless barriers such as a PIN protected screen saver/lock are implemented. Rather
than continuing in this way the Aura concept erodes the user identity confidence over time; the longer it has been
since an authentication was undertaken the lower the confidence will be. This degrading value will then be
assessed and utilised to restrict some of the processes and applications available for use; eventually at a
prescribed threshold unobtrusive re-authentication will be executed to reaffirm the user’s identity. It is of course
rather simplistic to simply erode the confidence and so to counteract this effect the concept incorporates
communicated authentication details from other trusted devices to positively boost the device’s identity
confidence. Thus at a point in time the device has a confidence in the user’s identity that is a combination of time
since last authentication, the authentication method used and information received from surrounding devices.
The Aura concept’s calculation of user identity confidence is encapsulated by Equation 1.
݊
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Equation 1. Formula for calculating a device's user identity confidence
In the equation:
x

x signifies the user device on which the confidence C is being calculated. C is bounded within the range 0.0
to 100.0 inclusively.

x

Function F1 calculates the amount of confidence using t the time since authentication was carried out on the
given device (x) and m the authentication method that was used.

x

n represents the number of devices (both intelligent and dumb) that constitute the current Authentication
Aura.

x

Function F2 yields the contribution to confidence that each Aura member (i = 1..n) makes to the receiving
device x. Similarly to F1 this function utilises both time since authentication (t) and the method used (m) in
its calculation.

With confidence eroding and a re-authentication threshold in situ the influence of the surrounding Aura members
will delay and even potentially postpone the need for the reaffirmation process to be undertaken. If the
framework and process model are designed with an appropriate logical path, it may indeed be the case that initial
activation authentication be by-passed because a suitably high level of confidence can be drawn from the
surrounding trusted devices.
It is appropriate to examine the potential of the confidence contribution to establish if there is sufficient evidence
to progress this concept and hone the method by which function F2 might be invoked.
Contribution from Aura members
It is vital to establish or at least explore how the function (F2 in Equation 1) might be conceived and operate.
Previous work has indicated that inherited confidence should be influenced by and adapt to location, the types of
devices active within the Aura and the authentication methods they use (Hocking et al., 2010); these should thus
be incorporated into the implemented function. To achieve this it is necessary to quantify scales of numeric
values that can be implemented and then assessed to gauge performance.
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As an initial first step, location can be allocated a simple tri-value range, home, work or other; equated to 3, 2 or
1 respectively. Apportioning values in this way will enable a variation in confidence contribution to be
accomplished. It is reasonable to argue that whilst at home devices should operate with less heightened security
and be more relaxed about the way in which they are being used. Similarly at work, although assured the
operating environment is less safe than within the owner’s home. Finally being away from both home and work
is the time when a device should be most wary and inherit least confidence from surrounding pieces of
equipment. Initially for assessment purposes this three point scale can be used as a simple multiplier resulting in
inherited confidence at home being 50% more significant than that received from the same devices at work and
three times more whilst in other unrecognised locations.
In addition to location, it is imperative that the significance of the device is somehow incorporated into the
contribution formula. As highlighted earlier in this paper some devices are more often detectable and less visible,
a combination which arguably makes them of greater significance. With this being a mathematical calculation it
seems sensible to allocate a ranking value (in the range 1..10) to each item of equipment owned by a user and
use this within the formula, this will be referred to as the device’s rank. It is proposed that a rank of 1 should
indicate the most significant pieces of equipment whilst 10 the least. This value can then be used as a divisor to
reduce the relative contribution of each device.
To establish the latent potential of drawing confidence from surrounding devices it is initially advantageous to
keep the function as simple as possible. Therefore, although Equation 1 indicated that the specific confidence of
any communicating device would be used currently a rigid maximum value will be set for each. To initiate
investigation this will be fixed at 15%. In a fully operational model this would be allocated on a device by device
basis and then reduced by the time that has elapsed since authentication and the method used.
Thus the initial formula for F2 and the contribution made by device i becomes:ͳͷ
൰  ൈ ݈
݅ݎ

ܿ݅ ൌ ൬

Equation 2. Formula for F2 to test the potential of confidence contribution made by each device
Where …
x

i signifies the contributing device.

x

r is the significance rank of device i (in the range 1..10).

x

l is the location multiplier (in the range 1..3).

Thus a device whose presence is regarded as being most significant (i.e. has a rank of 1) that is detected whilst
the user is at home (location multiplier equal to 3) contributes 45% to the confidence of the host device.
However, in the same location a device of medium significance (rank 5) would only contribute 9% and one of
least significance (rank 10) just 4.5%.
To aid in the clarity of this brief investigation a single day’s data for one user will be isolated and plotted so a
subjective appraisal can be made.
Table 2. Table of selected equipment and allocated rankings

Equipment
Rank
Wallet
2
Fridge
4
Locker
6
Bed clock
4
Laptop (Work)
8

Equipment Rank
Car (Home)
3
Microscope
5
Coat
4
Fax
9
WiFi (Home)
5

Equipment
Rank
Bag
4
MP3
6
PC
6
Car (Work)
5
Mobile (Work)
5

The user chose to tag the fifteen items of equipment shown in the table above, enabling them to be detected
during the experiment. The table also indicates the allocated ranking to each device.
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Figure 8. Subjective rankings for a single day's data and the associated percentage contribution
Introducing the subjective rankings (as shown in Table 2) to the data has the effect of yielding the cumulative
percentage contribution plot shown in Figure 8. The most significant devices and those set with the lowest rank
were the subject's home appliances, bag, personal car and mobile phone, whilst the remaining gadgets and
possessions were set with mid to high range values. Although this allocation is subjective it is based on the
premise that the higher ranking objects should be those that are personal or large and immoveable, providing less
obvious security enforcement. For instance, the user’s wallet is the highest ranking device (2), closely followed
by their personal car, bag, fridge and coat. Applying these ranking values to the devices and employing the
user’s location, the cumulative percentage contribution for the observed items, at each given point in time, was
calculated and then plotted against the associated time of day. This allocation of rankings appears to deliver a
good spread of contribution percentages, reflecting the environment and highlighting the potential of this
approach to deliver security enhancement. Without any degradation of confidence occurring on the
communicating devices the percentage contribution tops out at nearly 90%, a far greater figure than would
normally be observed. Although abnormally high this value further supports the argument that it may indeed be
possible in certain circumstances for newly activated devices to avoid having to perform a sequence of
authentication at all; the communicated confidence in the user's identity being sufficient.

CONCLUSION
An investigation into inherited confidence has demonstrated that there is indeed scope for such a methodology to
positively contribute toward this alternative approach to device security. Although the assessment of confidence
contribution was founded on simplistic algorithms the findings confirmed the latent potential of this method.
Extroverted awareness of surroundings and other objects can be positively leveraged both unilaterally and within
a cooperative set of devices. Surprisingly perhaps some of the greatest security reassurance can be drawn from
inert possessions that we might not readily expect, especially those that are not immediately visible but are
carried on a daily basis.
Utilising these findings as ground work for the next stage of investigation it is now possible to develop a
working prototype based upon the concepts outlined in this paper. Functioning agent software can now be
written and tested to further establish the practicality of this method and if there are restrictions that are currently
unforeseen.
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